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Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate whether cross-listed companies 
experience changes in their ownership structure after the oversea listing to 
improve the firm performance or exploit the weak shareholder’s rights. 
The conclusions are still ambiguous in the existence of current studies. 
Therefore, using the sample group of cross-listed companies in the Hang 
Seng China AH Premium Index from 2005 to 2014, we adopt the two-stage 
least square method to examine the alignment effects, conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis or strategic alignment hypothesis. To capture the relevant 
relationships between firm performance and controlling shareholders, the 
indicators of accounting-based performance and market-based 
performance are used in our analysis. The empirical results found that the 
largest ten shareholders will tend to increase the holding proportions 
when firm size and leveraged effect increase and the stock price commonly 
exists in over-reaction. Moreover, when the increase in the controlling 
shareholders’ holdings can improve supervised qualification and increase 
firm profitability, foreign institutional investors will tend to sell their 
shares to the largest shareholders after cross-listing. This finding is 
consistent with the strategic alignment hypothesis. Finally, we conclude 
that the variation of foreign institutional holdings will provide important 
information to determine whether the stock price presents a premium or 
discount.  
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of the Chinese economy, the 
capitalization of the stock market become the world’s major benchmark, 
and the capitalization of the stock market also presents significant growth. 
Therefore, the numbers of initial public offerings (IPOs) are persistently 
increasing. In general, IPOs are marketed to other investors and offer the 
shares to the market. Although the underwriting process can give minor 
investors a fair opportunity to participate in the offering, the mispricing 
problem and information asymmetric problem may exist among investors. 
In particular, the companies listed in China can be divided into two groups 
of public and state-owned, and the firm-specific characteristics of non-
tradable and tradable stock are different from other countries. Therefore, 
cross-listing has become a channel for improving liquidity in recent years. 
Many researchers have been devoted to investigating the motives of cross-
listing, observing the variations of firm’s value, and capturing the 
behaviors of controlling shareholders. 
Thus far, the conclusions of motives of cross-listings are still 
ambiguous. There are several reasons to explain why the companies decide 
to offer their shares. One reason is that the supervised qualification will be 
improved and effectively enhance the financial capacity when the company 
has cross-listings. In particular, if the initial price can be accurate pricing, 
the stock trades will have more liquidity. However, another statement is 
that the controlling shareholders can sell their shares to other investors 
through a cross-listing process. When mispricing and information 
asymmetry exist in the cross-listing process, the agency problem of 
exploiting weak shareholders will be raised. Consequently, these issues 
still need to be investigated in the developing stage of the Chinese stock 
market. 
Of primary concern to this paper is a focus on whether the controlling 
shareholders change their shares after cross-listing to improve the firm 
performance, which is alignment effects (Bushee, 1998) or to exploit the 
weak shareholder’s rights (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Porta et al., 1999; 
Ayyagari & Doideg, 2010), namely, conflict-of-interest hypothesis and 
strategic alignment hypothesis. In contrast to past studies, we employ two-
stage least square method to examine these effects to avoid 
multicollinearity and use different performance indicators to capture 
realized relationships among relevant variables. Moreover, considering that 
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the characteristics of the Chinese stock market are different from other 
counties, it presents the features of non-tradable stock and tradable stock 
resulting in increases in a number of cross-listed recent years. Therefore, 
this study further observes the influences of ownership structure in pre-
listing and post-listing using the AH Premium Index components. The 
controlling shareholders are divided into three major parts: the largest ten 
shareholders, foreign institutional investors, and stated holdings. It can 
help us to do our objectives. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is a 
literatures review related to studies of cross-listings. Section III describes 
the variables definitions and two-stage least square method. Section IV 
presents the data sources and descriptive statistics of relevant variables. 
The estimation and analysis from different models are also reported in this 
section. Finally, section V summarizes our empirical results and concludes 
the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
Stapleton & Subrahmanyam (1997) proposed the segmented markets 
hypothesis and argued that the initial public process can reduce the equity 
cost and risk undertaking. Therefore, Karolyi (1998, 2006) examined why 
do companies pursue to list shares abroad? The author surveyed relevant 
literature and concluded that a firm may pursue the benefit from a lower 
cost of capital, the more accessible to global investors, and mitigation of 
the restriction of international investment barriers. In addition, Bianconia, 
Chen, & Yoshino (2013) presented empirical evidence on the variations of 
a firm’s value on cross-listing. They indicated that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 may have segmented markets, but the market also result in that 
regulation is more stringent. 
On the other hand, the conclusion of Amihud & Mendelson (1986) 
implied that the liquidity of stock price of cross-listings is dependent on 
trading system, market structures, and market characteristics. Lang, Lins, 
& Miller (2003) argued that cross-listed companies get accurate analyst 
forecasts and increase a firm’s value. In addition, Wang & Jiang (2004) 
found that H-shares behave more similar to Hong Kong stocks than 
mainland Chinese stocks and provide foreign investors well diversification 
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opportunities. Similarly, Mittoo (1992), Fanto & Karmel (1997) & 
Berkman, Nguyen (2010), & Bahlous (2013) also support with the 
liquidity hypothesis. However, some studies provide different statements. 
From the perspective of the bonding hypothesis, Stulz (1999) and Reese & 
Weisbach (2002) noted that cross-listing companies can mitigate the 
exploitation of small shareholder’s rights and agency problems and further 
obtain lower costs of equity. In addition, these companies provide small 
shareholder protection well (Abdallah & Goergen, 2008). Doidge, Karolyi, 
& Stulz (2004) supported the liquidity hypothesis. They argued that the 
process of cross-listing can decrease the exploitation from large 
shareholders, along with obtaining lower cost of capital and higher 
liquidity (Valero, Lee, & Cai, 2009). Similar conclusions can also be found 
in Huang, Elkinawy, & Jain (2013).  
  In the ownership structure, Li, Brockmanb, & Zurbruegg (2015) 
suggested that institutional factors can explain the benefits of cross-listing 
companies, and given a well corporate governance qualification, foreign 
investors can provide the advantages of information improvement. 
Moreover, Jian, Tingting & Shengchao (2011) found that corporate 
governance is an important factor between the cross-listing strategy and 
firm performance. Finally, Doidge et al. (2009) investigated how firms 
decide to cross-list in the U.S. The author argued that when companies 
with high private benefits, controlling shareholders do not choose to cross-
list. By these statements, we can infer that cross-listing will affect a firm’s 
performance and stock liquidity, but it depends on corporate governance. 
In other words, thus far, the Chinese stock market lies in the developing 
stage. All investors should know whether there is agency problem and 
information is asymmetric in cross-listing companies. 
3. Variables and Empirical models 
This paper aims to investigate the listed companies of A shares over 
H shares in China from 2005 to 2014, which is the company cross market, 
after initial public offerings (IPO), what are the variations of the 
proportions of the largest ten shareholder holdings, foreign institutions 
holding, and state holdings? Whether there is a significant effect on firm 
performance. 
3.1 Variables Definition 
1. Dependent variables 
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In general, the operating efficiency of firm operation can reflect two 
types. They are currently used in the literature: accounting-based measures, 
such as return on assets, and market-based measures, such as stock returns. 
Conceptually, the accounting-based measures use historical data and, 
hence, constitute an ex-post perspective. In contrast, market-based 
measures use stock returns (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛), which represent how investors or 
shareholders evaluate firm performance in the future. Therefore, this is an 
ex-ante point of view. In this study, the Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) is defined 
as net income divided by average total assets. In addition, the stock returns 
are used to measure market-based performance as is calculated as the 
closing price at the end of the fiscal year divided by the closing price at the 
end of the previous fiscal year. 
3.1.2 Control variables 
Past studies, such as Valero et al. (2009), argue that oversea-listing 
companies with high asset size will obtain lower costs of issue equity than 
companies with a small size and get higher market liquidities. In addition, 
Fama & French (2002) and Lipson & Mortal (2009) use the nature 
logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. They argue that the 
bankruptcy cost and credit rating, firm size is expected to have high 
financial capacity, and a positive relationship between firm size and 
leverage (Huang & Song, 2006). Therefore, this study uses the definitions 
of the leverage effect in previous studies as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets.  
To isolate the other relevant effects, we also control for the influences 
of firm growth opportunities, firm-specific risk, and firm age. Intuitively, a 
high-growth firm might be reluctant to lend more, a lower cost to issue 
equity, and a stable stock price due to more confidence from market 
investors. Moreover, from the perspectives of information asymmetry and 
stability of operating profitability, although mature firms are expected to 
have high market shares and stable cash flow, this might also reflect lower 
sale growth. Therefore, there is an uncertain relationship between firm 
performance and firm age. By above, this study considers firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) 
measured by the nature logarithm of book value of asset the growth 
opportunities (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) using the market to book ratio of equity, the debt 
ratio (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) as a ratio of the total liability divided by total asset, 
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market to book ratio, stock return volatility (𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) calculated as 
three-year standard deviations of stock return, and firm age(𝐴𝑔𝑒), which is 
the length of establishment date of firm. 
3.1.2 Independent Variables 
Regarding the effects of ownership structure on firm performance, 
this study uses the proportions of the largest ten shareholders shares 
(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻), foreign institutional shares (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐻) and Chinese government 
holdings ( 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻 ) to examine whether high ownership concentration 
exploits weak shareholder benefits after cross-listed in AH shares index. In 
particular, because of high concentration on foreign institutional holdings 
and no tradable stock from government holdings, firms with a 
concentration of controlling shareholders may produce high information 
asymmetric problems and motive to exploit weak shareholder’s rights, 
resulting in poor firm performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Porta et al., 
1999). Therefore, there may be a negative relationship between 
concentration on controlling shareholders and firm performance. However, 
from the perspectives of efficient supervise and alignment effects, foreign 
institutional investors hold advantages of professional technology and 
information accessibility; they intend to improve supervised qualifications, 
to increase firm profitability and to decrease agency problems (Bushee, 
1998).  
However, according to the conflict-of-interest hypothesis and 
strategic alignment hypothesis, institutional investors tend to corporate 
with firm managers to exploit weak shareholders. Therefore, concentration 
on controlling shareholders will negatively affect firm performance (Pound, 
1988). Consequently, when a firm process oversea-listing behaviors, it is 
still ambiguous to conclude from the concentration of ownership structures 
on firm performance. Finally, past studies such as Glosten & Milgrom 
(1985) and Bortolotti & Siniscalco (2004) argue that high state shares will 
make bad corporate governance qualifications and result in low stock 
liquidities before non-tradable stock reform in 2005. However, the number 
of shares outstanding rose after non-tradable stock reform. As a result, firm 
profitability and information efficiency can be expected to improve. 
3.2. Model Specification 
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To do this, this paper follows the research from Ayyagari & Doidge 
(2010) to extend the sample period from 2008 to 2014, and further to 
examine the effects of ownership structure and on stock returns. We adopt 
the two-stage least square (2SLS) method to overcome the collinear 
problems. Using the companies of AH share, the empirical will provide if 
the cross-listed companies exploit weak shareholder rights and to replace 
their own private benefits. The empirical models are as follows. 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1                                                             (1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2                                                               (2) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3                                                             (3) 
For the equations (1) to (3), the dependent variables 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡  represent the proportions of the largest ten 
shareholders holding, foreign institutional holding, and state-owned 
holding, repectively, at 𝑖 firm at year 𝑡. In addition, the control variables 
include that the 𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation of three years of 
stock returns as a proxy of firm size; the 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is firm size and is denoted 
by the nature logarithm of book value of asset; the 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is the total 
liability divided by total asset; and finally the 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  are 
market to book ratio and the establishment age, respectively. The 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 is the 
error item and follows the assumption of a normal distribution pattern.  
After estimating the first-stage regression, the collinear problem with 
ownership structure and firm-specific characteristics have been isolated. In 
the second-stage regression, the net effects of ownership structure from 
equation (1) to equation (3) are three error terms. On the other hand, 
considering the influences of listing in AH shares index and state-owned 
companies, this paper sets up two dummy variables 
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(𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) to measure the impact of the corresponding 
variables, for example, when the i bank is the subsidiary of the financial 
holding, it is set to be 1, and the opposite is set to be 0. According to 
statements of Stoughton et al. (2001) and Sherman & Titman (2002), they 
point out that accurate pricing of IPO can bring high stock liquidity, but 
the mispricing of initial offerings will be less liquid. In particular, when a 
substantial amount of private information is not considered in stock’s 
initial price, it will negatively affect firm’s value. Therefore, the behaviors 
of cross-listing companies might have high information asymmetry. 
Similarly, Stoughton et al. (2001) and Sherman & Titman (2002), 
Ayyagari & Doideg (2010) investigate whether controlling shareholders of 
foreign firms to facilitate changes in ownership and control. Empirical 
results found that controlling shareholders are more likely to sell their 
shares to foreign investors. The change in voting rights from controlling to 
foreign investors was found in oversea-listing companies. Consequently, 
this study builds the two dummy variables to examine the effects of cross-
listing companies and state-owned companies. It is as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝛽8𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 + 𝛽9𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽10𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3 + 𝛽11𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 × 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽12𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 ×
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽13𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3 × 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
4                                              (4) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝛽8𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 + 𝛽9𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽10𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3 + 𝛽11𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 × 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽12𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 ×
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽13𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3 × 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
5                                                 (5) 
4. Comparison and Analysis 
4.1. Data Sources 
This paper focuses our analysis on cross-listed companies listed in the 
Hang Seng China AH Premium Index (AH Premium Index), which was 
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launched on 9 July 2007. It measures the absolute price premium of the 
company of both A-share over H-share listings. The sample data are 
collected from Taiwan Journal Economic (TEJ) database. In the past three 
decades, the stock market in China has become a major financial market in 
the world, and the number of listed companies has increased significantly.  
In particular, because institutional transformation makes the 
ownership structure in Chinese listed companies hold a high proportion of 
non-tradable shares, the policymaker decides to perform stock reform since 
2005 and to accelerate the transformation from non-tradable shares to 
tradable shares. Therefore, the phenomenon is significantly different from 
other stock markets and drives many companies to list in Hong Kong. It is 
called AH shares. By above, to capture the variations of ownership 
structure of cross-listed companies, using the yearly data the sample period 
covers from 2005 to 2014. After deleting missing data, the completed data 
have 272 observations, and the total number of cross-listed companies is 
37.  
According to our objectives, the relevant variables in financial 
statements gathered from TEJ include total assets at the end of per year, 
total liability at the end of per year, and book value in equity at the end of 
per year. In the ownership structures, the concentrations on major 
shareholders include the largest ten shareholders shares, foreign 
institutional shares, and stated-owned shares. Finally, the yearly closing 
stock price and outstanding shares are also obtained from the TEJ stock 
price database to measure stock returns and market value in equity. 
As for the exclusion criteria of key variables, this paper uses several 
criteria for the categorization and organization. The main criteria include 
the following: (1) the company is listed in the AH index constituent in 
2014; (2) the parent company with consolidated financial reports has 
completed data including the information of major shareholders holdings 
and stock closing price since 2005; if there is any missing data, the 
company would be excluded; and (3) according to historical statistics from 
the TEJ database, if the company is unable to be distinguished with 
reasonable information, it would also be excluded. 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
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Using the two-stage least square (2SLS) this study attempts to explore 
the relationships between firm performance and ownership structure in the 
companies AH shares index components. The impacts of change in 
controlling shareholders shares after cross listing are inconsistent in the 
existent of literatures, which are explained as alignment effects, conflict-
of-interest hypothesis or strategic alignment hypothesis Therefore, we 
gather the related variables from financial statement listed companies in 
AH shares during 2005 to 2014. The descriptive statistics is presented in 
Table 1. 
Using the two-stage least square (2SLS), this study attempts to 
explore the relationships between firm performance and ownership 
structure in the companies AH shares index components. The impacts of 
change in controlling shareholders shares after cross-listing are 
inconsistent in the existing literature, which are explained as alignment 
effects, conflict-of-interest hypothesis or strategic alignment hypothesis. 
Therefore, we gather the related variables from financial statement listed 
companies in AH shares from 2005 to 2014. The descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 1.  
In the firm profitability, the averaged values and standard deviations 
of both accounting-based performance, 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , and market-based 
performance, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 , are (0.0441, 0.0466) and (0.0055, 0.2885), 
respectively. The preliminary results indicate that the performance of 
cross-listing companies is significantly different. In particular, the range of 
two performance indicators achieves 46.79% in return on assets and 
177.69% in stock return, which are calculated by maximum value minus 
minimum value. In other words, the information asymmetric problem or 
market inefficiency may exist among different companies when these 
companies have cross-listing issues in equity. In addition, by observing the 
firm-specific characteristics the means of stock return volatility 
(𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) and the establishment time (𝐴𝑔𝑒) also present that the mean 
value is less than standard deviation. The results may be attributed to 
mispricing of initial offerings.  
In terms of other firm-specific characteristics, the averaged values of 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , and 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  are 18.2175, 0.1652, and 2.4683, 
respectively, and the maximum values are 21.6009, 0.5794, and 17.5958, 
respectively. These results state that the firm size and financial capacity in 
the whole sample are significantly changed after cross-listing and further 
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increase stock liquidity (Valero, Lee, & Cai, 2009). However, the extreme 
growth opportunities measured by market to book ratio can also be inferred 
that there is a serious information asymmetric problem between young 
companies and mature companies. Finally, the distribution types of all 
firm-specific variables present right skew. The mean values are 
consistently larger than median value.  
As for the ownership structures, the averaged proportions of the 
largest ten shareholders shares, foreign institutional share, and non-
tradable state-owned shares are 76.67%, 1.79%, and 19.30%, respectively. 
The ranges from maximum value to minimum value are 76.15%, 53.73%, 
and 86.29%, respectively. It presents that the shares of controlling 
shareholders have significant change in the pre-listed period and the post-
listed period. From the perspectives of Ayyagari & Doideg (2010), they 
argue that companies may have a change in voting rights from controlling 
to foreign investors. The statements are so far inconsistent, providing 
detailed examinations are also the major purposes of this study. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Listed Companies in China AH 
Premium Index  
Note: The sample is the largest and most liquid mainland China companies with both A-share and 
H-share listings from 2005 to 2014. The total numbers of cross market companies are 38 after 
deleting the missing data. In addition, the 𝑅𝑂𝐴  and Return present the net earnings divided 
by book value of total asset and yearly stock returns. The 𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  is the standard 
deviation of yearly stock returns. The 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ,𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  and 𝐴𝑔𝑒  are the nature 
logarithm of book value of asset, the total liability divided by total asset, market to book ratio, 
and firm age. Finally, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻 , 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐻 , and 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻  are the proportion of largest ten 
shareholder shares, foreign institutional shares, and state shares. 
   mean   std min. 25% median 75% max. 
Firm Performance 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 0.0441 0.0466 0.2221 0.0188 0.0417 0.0685 0.2458 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 0.0055 0.2850 0.9424 0.1538 0.0017 0.1892 0.8345 
Firm Characteristics 
𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.9291 1.0429 0.2442 0.4566 0.6202 0.9392 8.3855 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 18.2175 1.3224 15.2340 17.3291 18.1788 19.0457 21.6009 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 0.1652 0.1360 0.0000 0.0699 0.1327 0.2287 0.5794 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 2.4683 2.1669 0.5617 1.2628 1.7791 2.9922 17.5958 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 19.4689 20.0616 2.0000 9.2500 14.0000 20.0000 111.0830 
Stockholder Structure 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻 0.7667 0.1655 0.2201 0.6565 0.8092 0.8917 0.9816 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐻 0.0179 0.0875 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5373 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻 0.1930 0.2473 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.4226 0.8629 
T. -Y. Pai,  C. -M. Huang, Y. -L. Wang 
 
108 
4.2. Regression Results 
To do our objectives, because it may have multi-collinearity among 
independent variables, namely, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics, to capture the realized effects, the two-stage least square 
method was proposed to examine our purposes. Accordingly, the pooled 
regression analyses in our empirical model would not result in biased 
estimations. Table 2 presents the regression results of firm characteristics 
on ownership structure in the listed companies in AH share index. In the 
largest ten shareholders model, the proportion of the largest ten 
shareholders (𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ) is found to be positively related to firm size 
(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡), leveraged effect (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡), and firm age (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) under at 
least 10% significant standard. The estimated coefficients are 0.0320, 
0.2018, and 0.0006. Assuming that the company tends to maintain the 
original capital structure, it is reasonable to explain why the large 
shareholders will increase their holdings to obtain higher expected returns 
when the firm’s assets are prepared to expand and increase the outside 
finance because the high leveraged effect is expected to produce higher 
firm performance and to enhance the efficiency of asset uses. 
Table 2. Regression Results of Firm Characteristics on Ownership 
Structure in the Listed Companies in China AH Premium Index 
  𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 
Parameters 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.1288  0.0895* 0.2362 
(0.1639) (0.0543) (0.2628) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
  0.0320*** -0.0038 -0.0050 
(0.0087) (0.0026) (0.0142) 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 
  0.2018*** -0.0417* -0.0935 
(0.0552) (0.0214) (0.1132) 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
0.0054  -0.0035**  0.0226*** 
(0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0059) 
𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
-0.0052 0.0083  0.0411*** 
(0.0095) (0.0066) (0.0103) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 0.0006*  0.0003* -0.0014** 
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Observations 272 272 272 
SSE. 6.6452 2.0108 15.1275 
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  𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 
Adj.  squareR  0.0849 0.0106 0.0666 
Log likelihood 117.9300 279.9013 6.4668 
Note: The Eicker-White estimated standard errors of are shown in the parentheses. The sample is 
the largest and most liquid mainland China companies with both A-share and H-share listings 
from 2005 to 2014. The dependent variables, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻 , 𝐼𝑛stit𝑆𝐻 , and GovSH , are the 
proportions of largest ten shareholders shares, foreign institutional shares, and state shares. 
The SVolatility  is the standard deviation of yearly stock returns. The Size , DebtRatio , 
Growth and Age are the nature logarithm of book value of asset, the total liability divided by 
total asset, market to book ratio, and firm age. The *, ** and *** in the table refer the 
standard of significant by 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
However, these influences were not found in foreign institutional 
shareholders and stated government shareholders. Although the high 
market-to-book ratio reflects market investors hold optimistic prospection, 
the foreign institutional shareholders model (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ) was negatively 
related to growth at the 5% significant level. This finding implies that the 
stock price might be an over-reaction. In addition, the proportion of stated 
holdings was positive growth opportunity (𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ) and stock return 
volatility ( 𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ) under a 1% significance level, along with 
negative relations to firm age. The coefficients are 0.0226, 0.0411, and -
0.0014, respectively. Two possible reasons are the following: 1. Political 
goals, the change in proportion of stated holdings might consider different 
reasons and 2. Infant industry argument, the policymaker would increase 
their shares based on assisting the infant industry. Generally, as higher 
holdings will bring good news such as high supervised qualification and 
financial capacity, the negative coefficient of firm age can be expected. 
Through the first-stage estimation, we obtain the error terms, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 , 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 , 
and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3 , which present net effects of different controlling shareholders on 
firm-specific characteristics. In spite of stock price divergence between A 
shares and H shares attributing to different market environments, different 
investors and inconvertibility, the firm’s characteristics still affect the 
proportions of major shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to isolate the 
interaction effects. Instead of the proportions of controlling shareholders, 
Table 3 shows the regression results of 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 , 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 , and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3  on firm 
performance. In terms of firm-specific characteristics the debt ratio 
( 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ) presents consistently negative influences on return on 
assets; the estimated coefficients are between -0.0853 and -0.1085 under a 
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1% significance level, but it is between 0.2153 and 0.3743 in market-based 
performance under at least a 10% significance level. This result implies 
that an increase in debt ratio increases the pressures of interest expenses 
and further reduces the accounting profits, but not in market-based 
performance. The results were consistent with perspectives of leveraged 
benefits. At least a 10% significance level, the firm age was consistently 
negatively related to firm performance, and the growth opportunity 
presented consistently positive relations. Finally, we can observe that the 
dummy variables have little effect on firm performance. The 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
and 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  denote the dummy variables. When the variables are 
equal to one, which is the initial offering date listed in the AH Premium 
Index or state-owned and is zero otherwise. 
Table 3. Regression results from firm performance in the listed companies 
in China AH premium index 
 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
Parameters 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
Coef. 
(Std error) 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
Coeff. 
(Std error) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.0999*** 0.1359*** 0.1257*** 0.3468* 0.0915 0.1133 
(0.0363) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.1884) (0.2289) (0.2416) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
-0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0181* -0.0044 -0.0052 
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0139) 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 
-0.0853*** -0.1065*** -0.1085*** 0.2153* 0.3707** 0.3743*** 
(0.0231) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.1158) (0.1472) (0.1485) 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
0.0057*** 0.0042** 0.0046** 0.0465*** 0.0595*** 0.0585*** 
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0090) (0.0098) (0.0097) 
𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  
-0.0070** -0.0035 -0.0044 -0.1827*** -0.2086*** -0.2066*** 
(0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0132) (0.0148) (0.0147) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
-0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0014** -0.0028*** -0.0027** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
-0.0348*** -0.0167 -0.0151 0.0338 -0.0358 -0.0392 
(0.0130) (0.0200) (0.0187) (0.0611) (0.0942) (0.0966) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
0.0007 0.0004 0.0057 -0.0289 -0.0270 -0.0380 
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0537) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1  
0.0609** 0.0582** 0.0674** -0.1846 -0.1008 -0.1214 
(0.0248) (0.0259) (0.0339) (0.1687) (0.1657) (0.1669) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2
  0.0354 0.0313  0.3456
*** 0.3546*** 
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 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
 (0.0299) (0.0314)  (0.1158) (0.1194) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3
 
  -0.0528   0.1159 
  (0.0569)   (0.3221) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1
× 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
-0.0248 -0.0211 -0.0075 0.3678* 0.2785 0.2514 
(0.0381) (0.0379) (0.0434) (0.2099) (0.2084) (0.2130) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2
× 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
 0.5119 0.3823  -4.1929* -3.9103* 
 (0.5391) (0.5506)  (2.2588) (2.2422) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3
× 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
  0.0232   -0.0544 
  (0.0580)   (0.3264) 
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 
SSE. 0.4556 0.4516 0.4405 10.0734 9.8973 0.1957 
Adj.  squareR
 
0.1980 0.1989 0.2126 0.5248 0.5295 0.5282 
Log likelihood 481.0583 486.2608 485.6345 61.5627 63.9519 64.6190 
Note: The Eicker-White estimated standard errors of are shown in the parentheses. The sample is 
the largest and most liquid mainland China companies with both A-share and H-share listings 
from 2005 to 2014. The dependent variables, 𝑅𝑂𝐴 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛, the net earnings divided by 
book value of total asset and yearly stock returns. The  SVolatility is the standard deviation of 
yearly stock returns. The Size, DebtRatio, Growth and Age are the nature logarithm of book 
value of asset, the total liability divided by total asset, market to book ratio, and firm age. *, 
** and *** in the table refer the standard of significant by 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
1 , 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 , and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3  denote that the 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑆𝐻 , 𝐼𝑛stit𝑆𝐻  , and GovSH  are net effects of the 
proportions of largest ten shareholders shares, foreign institutional ten, and state ten. The 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 and 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 denote the dummy variables. When the variables are equal to 
one, which is initial offering date listed in AH premium index or state-owned and is zero 
otherwise. The *, ** and *** in the table refer the standard of significant by 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Regarding the effects of controlling shareholders, the proportion of 
the largest ten shareholders was positively correlated with 𝑅𝑂𝐴 at a 5% 
significance level, and the proportion of foreign institutional shareholders 
was positively correlated with stock returns. From statements of alignment 
effects, the increase in controlling shareholders shares is expected to be a 
highly supervised qualification and can mitigate the agency problem. 
However, we further observe the interaction of controlling shareholders 
after cross-listings on firm performance. The foreign institutional investors 
present significant negative effects, which are -4.1929 and -3.9103. The 
estimated coefficients indicate that the foreign institutional investors will 
tend to sell their shares but not found in the largest ten shareholders when 
the company behavior cross-lists. This finding is inconsistent with 
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conclusions of Ayyagari & Doideg (2010), who point out that the 
companies may have a change in voting rights from controlling to foreign 
investors. Moreover, the net effect of foreign institutional investors was -
4.5385 (-4.1929+0.3456) and -4.2649 (-3.9103+0.3546) after cross-listing, 
respectively. This result is consistent with strategic alignment hypothesis. 
5. Conclusions 
Using cross-listed companies in the Hang Seng China AH Premium 
Index from 2005-2014, this paper attempts to examine whether controlling 
shareholders exploit weak shareholder’s rights. According to the 
statements of past studies, such as Bushee (1998) and Ayyagari & Doideg 
(2010), the changes in proportions of controlling shareholders might have 
alignment effects, conflict-of-interest hypothesis or strategic alignment 
hypothesis. The conclusions are still inconsistent and ambiguous. 
Therefore, we adopt the two-stage least square method to estimate the 
influences of controlling shareholders on accounting-based performance 
and market-based performance. From the empirical results of first-stage 
regression, given the condition of that the company tends to maintain the 
original capital structure, the large shareholders will tend to increase their 
shares when firm size and leveraged effect increase. However, the 
influences were not found in other major shareholders. In addition, we 
found that the AH stock price exists in the overreaction phenomenon. 
Moreover, the results of the second-stage regression point out that the 
increase in major shareholder holdings will improve supervised 
qualifications and decrease the agency problem among shareholders. 
However, foreign institutional investors will tend to sell their shares to the 
largest shareholders after cross-listing. This finding is inconsistent with the 
conclusions of Ayyagari & Doideg (2010) and supports the strategic 
alignment hypothesis. Consequently, we suggest that the variation of 
foreign institutional holdings will provide more information to determine 
whether the stock price has over-reaction if market investors want to adjust 
their investment allocation of cross-listed companies, and the change in 
largest shareholders holding also provide relevant information. 
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